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1 Introduction 
According to an inferential role semantics (IRS), that an expression is or would be 
employed in specific inferences is determinative of its meaning.
1
 Correlatively, on this 
view, for any given speaker to grasp a particular meaning she must be disposed to 
make certain inferential transitions involving it.
2
  
 
Several years ago, Arthur Prior (1960) objected to IRS on the following grounds. 
Given IRS, one could presumably provide a meaning for a connective ‘tonk’ by 
determining that it is to be employed according to the following rules: 
 tonk-introduction  p  tonk-elimination p tonk q 
    p tonk q    q 
Evidently, by following these rules for the use of ‘tonk’, and so in virtue of grasping 
the supposed meaning of ‘tonk’ alone, one could infer any claim from any other 
claim. Prior took this to be a reductio ad absurdum of IRS. One cannot give an 
expression a genuine meaning simply be stipulating that it is to be employed in 
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inference in a certain way. As Nuel Belnap diagnoses the complaint, a ‘possible moral 
to draw from this’ is that one ‘must first […] have a notion of what [an expression] 
means, independently of the role it plays as premise or conclusion’ (1962: 130). That 
is, the example seems to show that it is in virtue of having an antecedent grasp of an 
expression’s meaning that one can make judgements as to its inferential significance. 
Hence, the latter cannot be constitutive of the former. Inferential rules do not 
determine meaning. 
 
The traditional response on behalf of IRS—call it ‘conservatism’—is that the relevant 
expression does not have a genuine meaning, since the introduction of ‘tonk’ does not 
constitute a conservative extension of the language (Belnap 1962).
3
 An extension of 
the language is conservative if and only if one cannot use the new vocabulary to 
derive any statements in the original vocabulary that could not already be derived 
using the original vocabulary. More informally, the problem is that non-conservative 
rules for the use of an expression clash with the meanings of existing expressions or, 
rather, the rules governing their employment. The novel rules ‘clash’ in the sense that, 
when added to the established rules, they lead to contradiction. As a result, the 
extended language is inconsistent.
4
 
 
This is evident in the case of ‘tonk’. Were one to employ the connective according to 
the above rules, one could derive any statement in our tonk-free vocabulary from any 
other statement in that vocabulary. Suppose, for example, that one accepts ‘Grass is 
green’. According to tonk-introduction, from that sentence, ‘Grass is green tonk it is 
not the case that grass is green’ follows (as do infinitely many other sentences). From 
this, in turn, according to tonk-elimination, ‘Grass is not green’ follows, which 
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manifestly contradicts the original sentence from which it was derived. In such a way, 
assuming the meanings or rules for the use of the other expressions remain constant, 
the tonk-rules lead immediately and without auxiliary premises to contradiction; their 
introduction to the language renders it inconsistent. 
 
The constraints imposed by conservatism proscribe the fraudulent connective ‘tonk’ 
by ruling out the introduction of non-conservative rules of the kind that would 
generate inconsistency in the manner outlined above. In doing so, they guarantee that 
there is no defective meaning possessed by ‘tonk’ and so no counter-example to IRS. 
 
Crucially, conservatism does not rule out extension of a language per se. One can 
imagine, for example, a vocabulary lacking terms of aesthetic appraisal. Conservatism 
allows the introduction to it of such terms, since the rules governing their use would 
be compatible with those governing the existing expressions. No statements in the 
pre-aesthetic vocabulary could be derived using the aesthetic vocabulary that could 
not already be derived using the pre-aesthetic vocabulary. 
 
The introduction of the conservative constraint as a solution to the problem ‘tonk’ 
would otherwise pose might seem ad hoc, but arguably it is already an implicit aspect 
of IRS. According to IRS, recall, an expression’s meaning is determined by how it is 
employed in inference. Should a connective such as ‘tonk’ be introduced (as defined 
above) to a ‘tonkless’ language, like our own, an arbitrary sentence q would appear 
then to follow immediately from any other arbitrary sentence p when it did not follow 
previously. Given IRS, it must be the case that either the inferential significance of p 
(or one of the expressions it contains) has changed, and thereby its meaning, or q does 
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not really follow, i.e. the rules do not really hold and so ‘tonk’ does not really have a 
meaning. One cannot deny that one of the disjuncts obtains while holding on to IRS. 
Thus, allowing non-conservative extensions of a language conflicts with the basic 
thesis of IRS.
5
 
 
The requirement of conservatism seems to rule out the kind of problem case Prior 
introduces. Recently, however, this problem has resurfaced in a rather different guise, 
conservatism has been rejected as inadequate and alternatives responses advanced. In 
this paper, I shall argue that these alternatives are ineffective, and defend the 
conservative account against criticism.  
 
2 The problem of pejoratives 
An apparent difficulty for IRS is raised in a recent exchange between Paul Boghossian 
(2003a; see also 2003b) and Timothy Williamson (2003; see also Forthcoming).
6
 The 
problem is that there are (putative) instances of speakers that seem fully or adequately 
to understand an expression, and yet are not prepared to employ it in inferences on the 
grounds that it is defective in some respect. Vivid examples of this are pejorative 
expressions such as ‘Boche’. Following a proposal by Michael Dummett (1981: 454), 
a proponent of IRS might hold that to grasp the meaning possessed by that term is to 
infer according to rules such as: 
Boche-introduction: x is German Boche-elimination: x is Boche 
    x is Boche    x is cruel 
Note that this is not being presented as an accurate description of the usage of racist 
terms; rather, it serves here to motivate a particular issue and—as the proposal 
Boghossian and Williamson focus on—is provisionally accepted for the sake of 
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argument. How exactly to characterise the rules for the employment of a derogatory 
expression is not the issue; whether there could be such rules is the philosophical 
question of current concern. Indeed, as we shall soon see, there is independent reason 
for a proponent of IRS to reject the above as a possible account of the rules 
determinative of the meaning of ‘Boche’. 
 
It is clearly a large part of the attraction of the above proposal, on behalf of IRS, that 
it seems to capture what is defective about derogatory terms, namely that the rules for 
their use embody inferences non-bigoted speakers cannot endorse. As Williamson 
says (although he does not accept this evaluation) one might regard the above account 
as providing IRS ‘with a positive success by elegantly explaining in inferentialist 
terms what is wrong with pejorative expressions’ (Forthcoming). Unfortunately, 
however, it instead leads immediately to the following problem for IRS. Since, for the 
reason mentioned, most speakers (including you and I) are simply not disposed or 
prepared to infer according to rules such as Boche-introduction and Boche-
elimination, it appears to follow (given IRS) that those speakers do not understand the 
term ‘Boche’ or grasp its meaning. It appears also to follow that only bigots 
comprehend that expression, and hence genuine communication with (and criticism 
of) bigots is not possible. All of this is, of course, implausible. As Williamson glibly 
says: 
We find racist and xenophobic abuse offensive because we understand it, not because 
we fail to do so. (2003: 257)
7
 
Pejorative terms, then, appear to provide a counter-example to IRS; they cast ‘doubt 
on the existence of […] tight connections between what concepts one has and how 
one infers’ and so ‘on inferentialist accounts of concept possession and linguistic 
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understanding’ (Williamson 2003: 250). An expression can possess a certain meaning 
without speakers being prepared to make the relevant inferences involving it; its 
inferential role is therefore not constitutive of its meaning. It is in virtue of having an 
antecedent grasp of meaning that one can make judgements as to the inferential 
significance of an expression. 
 
One might think that a way to avoid this would be to introduce a primitive normative 
notion. According to this revised IRS, for a given expression, one need not actually 
make or be disposed to make any inferential transitions involving that expression in 
order to understand it or for it to possess a meaning, but only to acknowledge the 
correctness of doing so. The propriety of those moves is determinative of its 
meaning.
8
 So, to return to the example, to understand ‘Boche’, one need only know 
that one ought to infer according to Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination; one 
need never as a matter of fact do so. 
 
Of course, clearly this only re-introduces the same problem in an altered form. Not 
only are most people not disposed to infer according to the above rules, but they do 
not even think it is proper to do so. On the contrary, they are confident one ought not 
to. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that they do not understand the 
corresponding term.
9
 
 
Note how this recent problem differs from Prior’s original objection. According to the 
latter, IRS allows one to introduce into a language obviously defective expressions. 
According to the former, our language obviously contains certain defective 
expressions and IRS is unable to explain how. 
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Nevertheless, it is apparent that if conservatism is a genuine constraint and a proper 
part of IRS it applies equally to both ‘tonk’ and accounts of pejorative terms along the 
above lines. One must deny, therefore, that the term ‘Boche’ has any such meaning, 
that there is an expression governed by Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination. 
This is not to deny that bigots might as a matter of fact use the term in that way, but to 
deny that such a usage could be determinative of the meaning of ‘Boche’. Those 
rules—assuming that ‘German’ and ‘cruel’ retain their established meanings—are 
non-conservative.
10
 They allow one to make without the aid of collateral information 
the transition from, for example, ‘Merkel is German’ to ‘Merkel is cruel’, when one 
could not do so in the ‘Boche’-free language. More informally, Boche-introduction 
and Boche-elimination clash with the rules governing the employment of existing 
terms, in the sense that supplementing them with the Boche-rules leads to 
contradiction, rendering the extended language inconsistent. 
 
Suppose, for example, that Merkel was born in Germany and does not cause suffering 
with disregard. On this basis—given what one may assume to be among the 
established inferential rules for the employment of ‘German’ and ‘cruel’—one infers 
‘Merkel is German and is not cruel’. However, by following Boche-introduction one 
may make the transition to ‘Merkel is Boche and is not cruel’, and in turn Boche-
elimination allows one to infer ‘Merkel is cruel and is not cruel’. Hence, in such a 
way, the introduction of the Boche-rules to a ‘Boche’-free language leads to 
contradiction (given the rules governing the established expressions). 
 
Conservatives and Racists 
 8 
Since it is non-conservative, and given the requirement of conservatism, the above 
account of the meaning of ‘Boche’ is bogus and so does not constitute a counter-
example to IRS. This point does not depend on the exact details of Dummett’s 
proposal; the same will be true of any model of pejoratives according to which we 
accept the grounds for introducing them but not the consequences of doing so. 
 
Unfortunately, it is clear that ruling out proposals of the above kind—where the 
derogatory aspect of an expression results from the inference rules governing it—by 
appeal to conservatism does not alone solve the problem Williamson poses for IRS. It 
is successful in the case of ‘tonk’ precisely because we want to banish it from the 
language, but it is of less help in the case of ‘Boche’ precisely because our language 
already contains it.  
 
For this reason, one might reject or set aside the requirement of conservatism in the 
case of pejorative terms and recommend a different approach. In the next sections I 
shall examine two such accounts by Boghossian and Robert Brandom. While they are 
both worth attending to, I shall focus primarily on Brandom’s as it has yet to receive 
much critical attention and as Williamson has already effectively criticised 
Boghossian’s. 
 
Before moving on, however, it is worth noting that to deny (on grounds of 
conservatism) that ‘Boche’ has a meaning that is defined by Boche-introduction and 
Boche-elimination is not to deny that it has any meaning at all. More generally, to say 
that conservatism rules out this way of construing derogatory terms is not to say that it 
(implausibly) rules out derogatory terms. Rather, it is to suggest that IRS needs to 
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provide an alternative explanation of pejoratives, including ‘Boche’. I shall return to 
this below. 
 
4 Boghossian’s proposal 
Boghossian rejects the conservative account,
11
 according to which no genuine 
meaning is defined by Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination (or any analogous 
proposal regarding the meaning of pejoratives). His reasons for doing so will be 
discussed later, but first I shall outline and assess his alternative. 
 
Boghossian suggests that, where possible,
12
 the inferential rules one must grasp in 
order to understand an expression must be conditionalized (2003a: 244-8; cf. 2003b: 
29-34). So, for example, to grasp the meaning of ‘Boche’, one must be disposed to 
affirm, or accept the propriety of, the following (where ‘T’ represents Boche-theory): 
 (∃F) T(F) & Fx → x is Boche 
The corresponding introduction and elimination rules are: 
 Boche*-introduction (∃x) T(F) & Fx   
    x is Boche    
 
Boche*-elimination x is Boche 
(∃x) T(F) & Fx 
On this account, if one is to understand ‘Boche’, one must hold that if something 
satisfies Boche-theory then that something may be called ‘Boche’. This enables a non-
bigoted speaker, according to Boghossian, to endorse the rules (and so understand the 
term), since she can affirm the conditional while denying the antecedent, i.e. she can 
deny that anything actually plays the role specified by Boche-theory. So, one can be 
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disposed to infer according to the Boche* rules—or acknowledge the propriety of 
doing so—and yet not endorse the bigot’s view by denying that (∃x) T(F) & Fx. (Note 
that, on this view, since the inferential rules differ, ‘Boche’ has a different meaning 
from that given by Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination, call it Boche*.) 
 
This proposal also points to a reason for viewing Boche-introduction and Boche-
elimination as defective, ‘one that doesn’t depend on denying’ that they determine 
that utterances of expressions involving ‘Boche’ in accordance with those rules 
express ‘genuine thinkable contents’ (2003b: 29). The problem, Boghossian holds, is 
not that the rules are non-conservative, but that they have an unconditionalized 
structure when a conditionalized structure is available, i.e. one that conditionalizes on 
the truth of the set of bigoted claims or beliefs (embodied by the original rules).  
 
Unfortunately, as the considerations Williamson (2003) adduces show, Boghossian’s 
alternative to conservatism simply does not afford a response to the matter under 
consideration. Even if one grants that rules of this form are available—and I am sure 
that they provide a good explanation of the significance of many theoretical terns—
nothing in the above account shows that there could not be a genuine meaning 
constituted by the original Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination rules. Indeed, 
Boghossian expressly aims to allow for that possibility, claiming (of concepts but 
presumably the same is to hold of meanings) that they ‘are relatively cheap’ (2003a: 
246). 
 
To appreciate the respect in which this position is too permissive, consider 
Williamson’s example of the reformed bigot who used to infer according to Boche-
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introduction and Boche-elimination but has since seen the error of her ways (2003: 
257-8). She is no longer disposed to infer according to those rules, and does not 
acknowledge the propriety of doing so. Even if she now follows the Boche*-rules, it 
still follows, given IRS, that she does not grasp the previous meaning of ‘Boche’. But 
it is massively implausible to hold that the reformed speaker is literally unable to 
comprehend any of her former racist claims. Boghossian’s alternative account of the 
kind of inferential rules that might govern ‘Boche’ does nothing to address this 
matter. 
 
Since it continues to allow for the possibility of a non-conservative extension of the 
language—and, more specifically, allows that ‘Boche’ in a bigot’s mouth might have 
a meaning determined by Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination—Boghossian’s 
proposed account therefore does not protect IRS from seemingly implausible 
consequences. 
 
4 Brandom’s liberalism 
Brandom also rejects conservatism. Non-conservative extension of a language, he 
holds, is not necessarily a defect in the novel expression or meaning one is attempting 
to introduce. ‘Conceptual progress in science’, he maintains, often involves and 
depends on this kind of novelty. As an alternative, Brandom proposes what he takes to 
be a more liberal, and suitable, model. When a practitioner employs a given 
expression, she undertakes various commitments concerning both her grounds for and 
the consequences of doing so. A linguistic practice can therefore be assessed and 
criticised according to whether or not one is or could be entitled to those 
commitments. As Brandom puts it: 
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The proper question to ask in evaluating the introduction and evolution of a concept is 
not whether the inference embodied is one that is already endorsed, so that no new 
content is really involved, but rather whether that inference is one that ought to be 
endorsed. The problem with ‘Boche’ […] is not that once we explicitly confront the 
material inferential commitment that gives the term its content it turns out to be 
novel, but that it can then be seen to be indefensible and inappropriate—a 
commitment we cannot become entitled to. (2000: 71-2) 
So, for Brandom, ‘Boche’ genuinely possesses the meaning defined by ‘Boche-
introduction’ and ‘Boche-elimination’, which is (or could be) grasped by racists, 
despite the fact that those rules are not conservative. The reason they are defective is 
instead that they incorporate—what non-bigots take to be—materially bad inferences. 
 
Boghossian rejects this model for the reason that it does not seem to capture the 
respect in which ‘Boche’ (so defined) is defective. On Brandom’s account, one is 
provisionally entitled to infer according to the proprieties governing its use, although 
that entitlement might be defeated by various substantive considerations. But, 
Boghossian insists, in the case of Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination, one 
does not have ‘any entitlement there at all, defeasible or no’ (2003: 242).  
 
Brandom might respond to this by charging it with a Platonism with which IRS is at 
odds (cf. 2000: 4). Whether an inferential transition is proper is not determined by 
whether it corresponds to some language-transcendent reality but rather, in the first 
instance, by the attitudes of subjects—what they take to be or treat as proper.
13
 Hence, 
in the case of ‘Boche’, so long as practitioners treat it in practice as such, one is 
indeed entitled to use that term in that manner, or infer according to Boche-
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introduction and Boche-elimination, at least until attitudes change (through scrutiny of 
the empirical credentials of the material inferences it incorporates). 
 
While this suggested ‘pragmatist’ rejoinder might be effective against Boghossian’s 
objection, Brandom’s model remains problematic. In particular, his account of 
‘conceptual progress’ is—though sketched only briefly—unstable as it stands. 
Brandom holds that it is possible to introduce a genuinely meaningful expression that 
is nevertheless not a conservative extension of the language, i.e. the rules for which 
clash with existing semantic rules.
14
 Presumably, then, in order for it to be possible 
actually to employ the novel expression—really to be able to incorporate it into the 
language—one must make an alteration in the pre-existing, established rules of 
inference. However, since those rules are determinative of meaning, any such revision 
will result in a change in the established meanings that subsequently are compatible 
with the use of the new expression. Thus, the case is not really one of non-
conservative extension at all.  
 
Brandom suggests that one need not treat this activity as necessarily involving the 
founding of new meanings. He prefers to talk instead of refining and honing terms by 
‘improving’, ‘grooming’ or ‘repairing’ the inferential commitments they incorporate 
(2001: 71, 75). However, one simply cannot hold both that being subject to certain 
inferential proprieties is necessary and sufficient for possessing a certain meaning and 
that what inferences are taken to be proper can vary while meaning remains constant. 
It is in this respect that Brandom’s position is unstable. His model of conceptual 
progress appears to be incompatible with IRS. 
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The issue of how genuinely to incorporate non-conservative inferential rules into the 
language does not in fact address the underlying problem. Recall that Brandom tells 
us that the proper question concerning a novel expression is not, ‘Is its introduction 
conservative?’ but rather, ‘Ought one to accept the inferential proprieties governing 
it?’ However, the problem with ‘Boche’ is not that one should not infer according to 
its introduction and elimination rules but that—given the existing rules for 
‘German’—there are and can be no such rules as Boche-introduction and Boche-
elimination to follow or otherwise. Consider what it would be for a speaker to grasp 
the meaning of ‘Boche’ so defined. She would take ‘Merkel is German’ to entail 
‘Merkel is cruel’. But, then, whatever she means or understands by ‘German’ it is not 
what we do. If it does possess a meaning in her mouth, it is not German (although, of 
course, it may be akin). Hence, the possibility of non-conservative rules is only 
apparent. 
 
Brandom might reply that revision of established rules is better described, not as 
changing the meanings altogether, but as discerning what the proprieties of inference 
really are, and were all along, regardless of what speakers formerly took them to be 
(cf. 1994: 657). So, the proprieties remain constant; it is speakers’ grasp of them that 
varies. Thus, to stick to the example, it is in principle possible that Boche-introduction 
and Boche-elimination are conservative and that we are in fact wrong about the norms 
to which our use of ‘German’ is subject, and so about what significance it has. 
 
It is hard, however, to imagine how this suggestion could be unpacked in a way that 
does not relinquish IRS to Platonism, i.e. without suggesting that meaning or 
inferential proprieties could be in place independent of speakers’ attitudes, which 
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would in turn leave the account open to Boghossian’s objection. Second, in any case it 
still does not offer the possibility of a genuine non-conservative extension of the 
language. On this story, what occurs is that speakers discover that—contrary to 
appearances—the novel terms or rules actually are consonant with the existing rules, 
and that the speakers were in fact mistaken about just what those rules are. 
 
So, Brandom’s motivation for rejecting conservatism—i.e. to allow for his liberal 
model of conceptual progress—is ungrounded, because that model does not constitute 
a genuine alternative.
15
 
 
It is, however, possible that Brandom can avoid these problems given the 
(labyrinthine) details of his particular version of IRS. More specifically, his insistence 
on an essential social dimension to linguistic practice may provide the resources to 
resolve matters without conceding to Platonism (see 1994: ch.8). I am sceptical that 
this is so, but adequately engaging with that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
16
 Fortunately, it is not necessary, since Brandom’s alternative model does not 
anyway address what Williamson highlights as so problematic about the example of 
pejorative terms. On Brandom’s model, bigots do grasp the meaning of ‘Boche’, 
while non-bigoted speakers ‘refuse to employ’ that expression ‘on the grounds that it 
embodies an inference’ they do not endorse (2000: 70). Moreover, not only are non-
bigoted speakers not actually disposed to infer according to Boche-introduction and 
Boche-elimination, but they do not think it is proper to do so. From this, in 
conjunction with IRS, it follows that they do not understand the term. Intuitions, 
however, support the view that non-bigots know what ‘Boche’ means, something 
Brandom’s IRS is unable to accommodate. Hence, Brandom’s liberalism simply does 
Conservatives and Racists 
 16 
not address the matter Williamson’s objection raises. What is required is an 
explanation of how, according to IRS, bigots and non-bigots can grasp the same 
meaning, and so are able to communicate, despite differing in their linguistic 
dispositions or attitudes. 
 
5 The no-nonsense objection 
So far, I have identified problems with accounts that allow that the meaning of 
‘Boche’ might be given by rules that are non-conservative. In contrast to such 
proposals, I suggest that one accept the requirement of conservatism and so deny that 
there is a genuine meaning defined by Boche-introduction or Boche-elimination (or 
any other rules along those lines).  
 
However, because the endorsed conservative constraint rules out the original 
proposal, it does not appear to address the problem with which we began. Indeed, it 
appears to concede it. Given conservatism, it seems, pejorative terms lack meaning. 
Surely this strategy is mistaken. As Boghossian writes regarding the application of 
conservatism in this instance: 
[I]t is hard to believe that racists who employ boche-like concepts fail to express 
complete thoughts. (2003a: 243)
17
 
Call this the ‘no-nonsense’ objection; it rejects the conservative constraint on the 
grounds that it is implausible that derogatory terms lack significance and hence that 
bigots make no bigoted claims (and correspondingly express no bigoted thoughts) in 
using them. In this section, I shall argue that this objection to conservatism is 
unsuccessful. In doing so, I shall prepare the way for a more general defence of IRS 
against the threat derogatory expressions appear to pose.
18
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Accepting the applicability of the conservative constraint in this instance does not 
lead to the conclusion that bigots are not saying anything whatsoever, or express no 
thoughts, when they use the term ‘Boche’; it is to deny one account of its meaning, 
not to deny that it has meaning. The following alternative presents itself (but is not 
intended as exhaustive of the possibilities).
19
 
 
Careful examination of a racist’s use of the term ‘Boche’ might reveal it to mean the 
same thing as we mean by ‘German’. Thus, the meaning of ‘Boche’ is given by 
whatever inferential rules govern (and thereby determine the meaning of) ‘German’. 
Among them might be: 
 Boche**-introduction  x originates in Germany  
     x is Boche  
 
Boche**-elimination   x is Boche 
x originates in a central-northern European 
Republic 
One might immediately object that this proposal is even more implausible than its 
predecessor. If ‘Boche’ simply means the same as ‘German’, we have lost all sense in 
which it is a derogatory term. As Williamson voices the concern: 
The objection does not depend on the details of Dummett’s rules. Consider any set of 
rules that an inferentialist proposes for ‘Boche’. If they are logically 
unobjectionable—more specifically, if they constitute a conservative extension of a 
civilized ‘Boche’-free system of rules—then the inferentialist has no account of what 
is objectionable about ‘Boche’. (Forthcoming)
20
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Such a response is premature. One could explain the pejorative nature of ‘Boche’ by 
appeal not to its literal, semantic content, which is as it were neutral, but to its 
offensive associations, its conventional implicature.
21
 Thus, the racist’s fault lies in 
knowingly using a term that implicates that Germans are cruel. Note that this 
explanation of the significance of a derogatory expression has two components, 
semantic and pragmatic. Inferentialism deals with that aspect of a word that is shared 
by its neutral counterpart (e.g. ‘German’)
22
 and an additional Gricean apparatus is 
wheeled in to explain the respect in which it causes offence. 
 
There is, then, simply no reason to think that the conservative attitude toward 
pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ entails that those terms lack significance or that bigoted 
speakers are unable to express racist claims. On the contrary, it allows one to lay 
blame precisely where one would wish to—with the bigots themselves. That is to say, 
according to conservatism, there are no ‘pejorative meanings’ whose content is 
intrinsically derogatory. Rather, there are individuals who intentionally employ words 
that are conventionally understood to convey (in addition to their literal semantic 
content) unfounded and bigoted beliefs. 
 
Interestingly, Williamson argues for an account of pejoratives very much along these 
lines. In his view, roughly, the literal semantic content of ‘Boche’ is simply that of 
‘German’. The reason its use in a sentence such as ‘Merkel is Boche’ is objectionable 
is that it conventionally implicates a belief such as that Germans are typically cruel. 
This belief is implicated rather than entailed by the utterance, he argues, since 
properly-speaking a non-bigoted speaker does not think that what is expressed by that 
sentence is falsified by the fact that Germans are not typically cruel (as it would be if 
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it were a logical consequence of what is said). And the implicature is conventional 
rather than conversational, in Grice’s sense, since it is detachable—one could use or 
construct a non-derogatory counterpart (e.g. ‘German’)—but not easily cancellable—
one cannot use ‘Boche’ and at the same time try to repeal the racist attitudes it 
conveys (Williamson 2003: 263).
23
 
 
Williamson claims, however, that an account of this kind—according to which 
‘Boche’ has the same literal meaning as ‘German’—is not available to one who 
recommends IRS. Even if the meaning of ‘Boche’ is not defined by Boche-
introduction and Boche-elimination, it is still the case that most speakers are not 
prepared—given its offensive implicatures—to employ that expression or make 
linguistic transitions involving it (whether or not they accord with the rules governing 
‘German’): 
Pejoratives pose a quite general problem for use theories of understanding on which 
using a term in a given way is a precondition of understanding it. Unprejudiced 
speakers may understand a pejorative term but still refuse to use it in the specified 
way: in order to avoid commitment to a conventional implication, they refuse to use it 
at all. (2003: 267-8) 
According to IRS, therefore, they do not understand the term ‘Boche’, which is false. 
Despite all the twists and turns, it appears that we are no further towards resolving the 
problem pejoratives pose to IRS than at the outset. 
 
One can and should, however, view the propriety of employment that is constitutive 
of the meaning of ‘Boche’ as distinctively semantic, as opposed to (say) 
epistemological, moral or social.
24
 Once this is recognised, one can appreciate that 
speakers can indeed acknowledge that inferring from ‘Merkel originates in Germany’ 
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to ‘Merkel is Boche’ is correct as far as the language alone is concerned, or 
according to the semantic norms determinative of its literal meaning, and still refuse 
to actually use the term ‘Boche’, since the propriety of doing so is trumped by other 
normative considerations (in this instance, moral). So, if an IRS distinguishes the 
relevant normative notion according to which inferences are correct or incorrect, it has 
the resources to meet Williamson’s reservations. 
 
Of course, this leaves a serious problem concerning how to understand this kind of 
propriety. It is far from clear that a great deal that is informative can be said on this 
matter, or at least that much can be said in independently intelligible or more basic 
terms. One might explain that it is the kind of propriety that is partially determinative 
of an expression’s literal meaning and of what is said by its use, or that equally 
governs the term’s translation. Needless to say, this does not get us very far. 
 
Should this prognosis prove correct, however, it does not necessarily constitute a 
problem for versions of IRS that appeal to such a notion of propriety, unless they 
purport to be reductionist. And one should certainly not take it for granted that only 
such an account could be satisfactory.
25
 In any event, the present concern is not 
whether IRS can provide a reductionist explanation of meaning, but whether it can 
account for the existence in a language of pejorative terms. I have argued that it can. 
 
6 Conclusion 
IRS seemed unable to explain the existence in a language of pejorative terms. 
Specifically, it appeared to have the implausible consequence that such terms lack 
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meaning and that non-bigoted speakers are unable to understand derogatory terms, 
since they are not willing to employ those terms when reasoning.  
 
On one prominent account—proposed by Dummett and accepted by Boghossian and 
Brandom—the fact that speakers are so reluctant is due to the fact that a pejorative 
like ‘Boche’ is governed by rules embodying inferences non-bigoted speakers do not 
endorse. According to conservatism, however, no such rules could determine the 
meaning of ‘Boche’. In this paper, I considered alternative responses on behalf of IRS 
to the threat of derogatory terms, different ways to characterise their faults, but found 
them to be inadequate. Next, I defended conservatism against an objection and in 
doing so offered an alternative and consonant account, on behalf of IRS, of the kind of 
rules that might govern the use of ‘Boche’ and thereby determine its significance. On 
the most promising view, IRS deals only with that aspect of a derogatory expression 
that is shared by its neutral counterpart, in this case ‘German’. That is, IRS only 
accounts for its literal, semantic content. The respect in which pejoratives cause 
offence is then to be dealt with by additional, Gricean apparatus. It is a matter for 
pragmatics, not semantics. While this proposal might limit the ambitions of some 
advocates of IRS, it is the most promising way of reconciling the latter with the no 
doubt unfortunate existence, within a language such as our own, of terms of abuse.
26
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Notes 
 
1
 For critical overviews of the arguments in favour of IRS, see Lepore 1994; Whiting 
2006b. Importantly, one need not hold that every inferential relation an expression 
stands in is determinative of its meaning. On the contrary, in order to ensure 
constancy and communicability of meaning, there is reason to privilege certain 
inferential relations as constitutive of meaning and treat others as non-constitutive 
(see Fodor and Lepore 1992; 2002). How precisely one draws that distinction need 
not concern us here (see Boghossian 1993; Glock 2003: ch. 3; Horwich 1998: ch. 9). 
2
 This captures the essence of a naturalistic version of IRS, of the kind offered by, 
among others, Harman (1999), Horwich (1998; 2005) and Peacocke (1992). 
3
 Dummett explores in detail a similar constraint, which he dubs ‘harmony’, of which 
conservativeness is an instance (see 1981: 396-7, 453-454; 1991: 215ff, 246ff). 
4
 For further remarks on the respect in which non-conservative expressions are 
‘inconsistent’, see Dummett 1981: 454; cf. Brandom 2000: 68. 
5
 Conservatism is implicit in this way in, e.g., Horwich 2005: 154. In discussing 
harmony, Dummett makes a similar point (1991: 220). 
6
 Note however that Boghossian actually endorses a version of IRS (at least for certain 
expressions). 
7
 Hornsby (2001) likewise charges IRS with being unable to provide a satisfactory 
account of derogatory words, but on quite different grounds. For a response, see 
Whiting 2007a. 
8
 Brandom advances a non-naturalistic version of IRS of this kind (1994; 2000). For 
defence of the idea that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion, see Whiting 
2007b. 
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9
 Note that this problem is made acute by the fact that most proponents (and 
opponents) of normativist versions of IRS do not distinguish the relevant norms that 
are supposedly determinative of meaning from other kinds of norms. And where they 
are differentiated, the norms are usually viewed as epistemic (this seems to be both 
Boghossian’s and Brandom’s view). Non-bigoted speakers, however, do not think that 
abiding by Boche-introduction and Boche-elimination is epistemically warranted. I 
shall return to these matters below. 
10
 As both Dummett (1981: 454) and Williamson (Forthcoming) point out. 
11
 Despite at one time endorsing it (Boghossian 1997: 359). Boghossian tends to 
present matters in more truth-oriented terms than I do here—i.e. in terms of whether 
semantic rules are truth-preserving—but that is not important for present purposes.  
12
 The meanings of the primitive logical constants cannot be determined in this way 
(Boghossian 2003a: 247). 
13
 The qualification ‘in the first instance’ is supposed to leave open the possibility of 
deriving a conception of attitude-independent (objective) propriety from attitude-
dependent (subjective) propriety. Brandom attempts just such a deduction in 1994: ch. 
8. For critical assessment, see Laurier 2005. 
14
 As discussed above, the non-conservative rules would clash with the established 
rules insofar as their addition would render the language inconsistent. 
15
 An alternative model of ‘conceptual progress’ would show it to involve the 
establishing of new inferential rules (and hence meanings), which are conservative but 
may nonetheless be similar in various respects to the old ones. The latter are 
superseded, not because speakers reject the relevant inferences (that could only betray 
misunderstanding), but rather because speakers no longer accept that the grounds 
specified originally for introducing the expression obtain. Progress would be achieved 
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if the grounds that the new rules give for introducing the expression genuinely obtain, 
and if those new rules suitably enrich the expressive resources of the established 
vocabulary. 
16
 For further assessment of the interpersonal dimension to Brandom’s theory, see 
Whiting Forthcoming. 
17
 Enoch and Shechter (2006) also press this complaint. 
18
 Needless to say, there are other objections to conservatism (see, e.g., Peacocke 
2004: 18ff) Addressing them is too great a task for this paper and I shall restrict 
attention to that which occurs in the present debate. 
19
 Again, the following proposal is not intended as an armchair contribution to 
linguistic theory. It is intended as a suggestion as to what rules could govern the use 
of racist terms, compatible with the requirement of conservatism. 
20
 Williamson repeats this point when he writes, ‘If the inference rules for “Boche” 
constitute a conservative extension of a civilized system of rules for the “Boche”-free 
part of the language, then they do not explain what is offensive about’ its use 
(Forthcoming). 
21
 On implicature, see Grice (1989: ch. 2). Obviously, this strategy depends on being 
able to offer an account of implicature in the terms available to IRS. This is evidently 
not the place to do so but there is no obvious reason to think it would prove 
impossible or especially difficult. The beginnings of such an account might proceed as 
follows. Where a claim is implicated by the claim made in uttering an expression, 
rejection of the former is compatible with acceptance of the latter. In contrast, where a 
claim is entailed by the claim made in uttering an expression, rejection of the former 
is incompatible with acceptance the latter (cf. the central role that the notion of 
incompatible commitments plays in Brandom 1994). Specific implicatures can then be 
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accounted for in terms of the inferences that the utterance of an expression invites as a 
result of either the dynamics of a given conversation or the way in which speakers 
have come customarily to use it and to respond to its use.  
22
 Hornsby (2001) points out that many derogatory words have neutral counterparts. 
Consider, for example, the pairs ‘Kike’ and ‘Jew’, ‘faggot’ and ‘homosexual’. 
23
 Of course, statements of the form ‘So-and-so is Boche, but not cruel’ or ‘Don’t get 
me wrong, I’ve got nothing against Boche…’ are familiar enough. But these would 
not be counter-examples to the suggestion. On the contrary, that we ordinarily find 
such utterances repugnant would be best explained by viewing the use of ‘Boche’ as 
conventionally implicating bigoted beliefs. What the racist is attempting to do on 
these occasions is unilaterally cancel the conventional implicature. Thus, racism is 
compounded by hypocrisy (cf. Williamson 2003: 263). 
24
 See n7. 
25
 For further remarks on the desirability and feasibility of a reductionist account of 
meaning, see Whiting 2006a. 
26
 Thanks to Andrew Jorgensen for discussion of these issues and for bringing them to 
my attention, to an anonymous referee for comments that greatly improved the paper, 
and to audiences at the universities of Antwerp, Granada and Reading for invaluable 
feedback on earlier versions of the material. 
